Chapter 4: Symbolism and Instrumentalism
In this chapter Boman starts out bouncing off of Canon Oliver Quick, an Anglican priest who wrote a good bit on philosophy.
Section A: The Hebrew Conception of the Thing
The mainstream view is that the Hebrew dabhar (normally “word”) can be translated “thing” in the sense of an issue for discussion, but it cannot indicate an unnamed object. Much closer is the Hebrew word kelî, essentially a “tool” or “implement” — musical instrument, weapon, vessel for liquids, an ornament. As always with Hebrew, the word indicates functionality. Finally, the Hebrew word ḥephets indicates trinkets or objects of desire (having a value), with the emphasis on someone treasuring it.
Section B: The Greek Conception of the Thing
Opposite the Hebrew active frame of reference, the Greek mind passively seeks to observe and understand the things in its environment. This becomes a clue to what is beyond the immediate environment. This is considered the prerequisite for action. Activity and knowledge are separate concepts, yet inseparable in practice.
Things are symbols to our knowledge and implements of our actions. They can also be riddles or hindrances, respectively. And for two pages Boman wanders over the terrain of abstract reasoning about the implications in human reasoning.
He notes that the Hebrew mind was more about metaphysics rather than physics. I would add that the moral purpose of things reigned supreme in their reckoning. They didn’t waste time trying to gain human control over the reality of life because they assumed it would bring only limited results anyway. The Greek mind was obsessed with gaining mastery, trying to maximize the cooperation of knowledge and use.
Eventually Boman gets around to pointing out that for Hebrews, things are signs as well as symbols, whereas for the Greek they are indicators of ultimate reality. For the Hebrew, ultimate reality is unknowable; for the Greek it is assumed to be within human reach. For the Hebrew, God is a moral entity known by His actions, and for the Greek, the ultimate reality is about being.
Boman does not say that Hebrew wisdom is revealed from above, and Greek wisdom in gained by human effort, but it certainly helps to understand all of his academic blather. This goes on for several pages, as usual ending in yet another effort to justify not embracing the Hebrew outlook, but trying to blend it with his Platonic views.
Excursus: The Transparence of God
This is Boman trying to show off again. He mentions that God is seen in western minds as both transcendent and immanent. These are normally mutually exclusive terms. He calls for a third term: God is not only above and in the world, but through the world. It’s more of where he left off in the previous section above. He tries to connect it with the Doctrine of the Trinity, and it should be obvious how that works out: Father (above), Christ (in) and the Holy Spirit (through) the world.
Thus, he wants to introduce the concept of God’s “transparence”. If you know the world at all, you will know God.
He goes on at length striving to justify sticking with the Greek view (of Plato) when approaching theology. He even tries to sanctify it by noting that the Hellenized world Paul traveled was still heavily influenced by pagan mysticism, and so he had no trouble offering a sort of Greek-Hebrew hybrid. But in Athens, it was pure Greek and they weren’t receptive. It required later generations of church scholars without the Hebrew background to make inroads with Greek intellectuals.
I’ve already addressed this often enough on this blog.
